Prince William County School Board Kept Fighting a Special Education Win: Fourth Circuit Protects Student’s Placement During Appeals
Prince William County School Board could have agreed to fund the student’s senior year at the private school a due process hearing officer found could provide her with FAPE. Instead, it kept fighting.
Virginia’s Prince William County School Board (PWCSB) failed in federal district court to overturn a due process hearing officer’s private school placement order. It later obtained a clarification limiting its tuition obligation.
Now the Fourth Circuit has ordered that the private school remains the student’s stay-put placement while both sides’ appeals continue.
The placement is protected for now, but the payment dispute remains unresolved.
Here’s What Happened
Due Process Appeal and Background
When I last wrote about Prince William County School Board v. Lassiter, the parents had prevailed before both a due process hearing officer and a federal district court judge.
February 29, 2024, a Virginia due process hearing officer found that Prince William County Public Schools failed to provide the student with a FAPE. The hearing officer found that a specific private school could provide the student with a FAPE, ordered that the student continue there at public expense and directed the division to convene an IEP meeting placing the student at the private school.
PWCSB challenged the decision in federal court.
November 13, 2025, U.S. District Judge Rossie Alston denied PWCSB’s motion for judgment. He found that the school board’s motion sought relief “untethered” to the claims in its complaint and that its prospective placement arguments rested on a “broad misreading” of the hearing officer’s decision.
He also found that the hearing officer had made the private school part of the IEP process, which meant the placement remained subject to annual review. PWCSB could continue reviewing the student’s needs and proposing a different IEP.
I ended my previous article by asking the following:
“The student will be a high school senior next year. Will PWCSB go the pragmatic route and pay for her to finish high school at the school in which she’s been enrolled for her first three years of high school?”
We now have an answer.
PWCSB chose to continue litigating.
How the Original Victory Was Narrowed
According to the parties’ later filings, the parents paid the remaining 2025-26 private school tuition in advance and sought reimbursement. PWCSB reimbursed the parents $6,700 but disputed whether it owed the remainder.
December 4, 2025, PWCSB filed a motion asking Judge Alston to clarify two points:
“With respect to the current school year, PWCS does not owe reimbursement for the entire year even though Parents have already prepaid the tuition for the entire year, rather PWCS’ reimbursement obligation ends on the date that a new IEP takes effect; and,
“A new IEP “takes effect” and is “in effect” on the date that it is proposed by PWCS pursuant to 8VAC20-81-110(B)(1) and not the date it is “consented to” by the Parents pursuant to 8VAC20-81-110(B)(2)(d).”
The parents opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion Dec. 12, 2025, asking the court to require PWCSB to show cause for its alleged failure to comply with the earlier orders. The parents maintained that the private school remained the student’s stay-put placement.
On April 22, 2026, Judge Alston granted the school board’s clarification motion. He held that the November opinion hadn’t determined that every amount shown on the parents’ Nov. 4, 2025, tuition receipt was due. He also rejected the argument that paying the tuition in advance required PWCSB to reimburse the entire 2025-26 school year.
Judge Alston concluded that the district court proceedings and the associated stay-put obligation ended Dec. 16, 2025. He ordered PWCSB to document reimbursement through Dec. 16 or the date a new IEP went into effect, whichever was later.
He also ruled that the new IEP could take effect without the parents’ consent. Judge Alston distinguished between an IEP being “in effect” and PWCSB implementing the IEP’s services, which would require parental consent:
“Finally, the parties dispute whether the “takes effect” language used by the Court in reference to a new lEP obligates PWCS to continue to pay The Wakefield School tuition until the Parents consent to a new lEP. The short answer in this regard is no. Such a construction of the Court’s Opinion would permit the Parents to circumvent the main thrust of the decision on the merits; that is, “[b]y making Student’s placement at The Wakefield School part of the lEP, the Hearing Officer made that placement subject to the annual review process for lEPs.’’ Dkt. 75 at 22. Moreover, the Court’s use of the language “takes effecf’ is consistent with the language in 8 VAC 20-81-110(B) which provides that “each local educational agency shall have an lEP in effect for each child with a disability” and that such plan is “in effect before special education and related services are provided.” 8 VAC 20-81-110(B)(1) and (2)(a). This is to be contrasted with the references to “implementation” which require parental consent. 8 VAC 20-81-110(B)(2)(d). Of note, the Parents did not address this argument in their Opposition/Motion to Show Cause.
PWCSB Reported Paying Through December 26
May 21, 2026, PWCSB filed an affidavit from Amanda Mallory, its director of procedural support and compliance. Mallory stated that an IEP meeting occurred Dec. 16, 2025, and that the IEP was “fully proposed” to the parents Dec. 26. For purposes of complying with the April order, Mallory used Dec. 26, 2025, as the date the new IEP took effect.
PWCSB calculated that six tuition installments of $3,350 had become due by Dec. 26, for a total of $20,100. After subtracting the earlier $6,700 reimbursement, PWCSB calculated that it owed another $13,400. Mallory stated that a $13,400 check was delivered to the parents’ home May 21, 2026, and asserted that PWCSB had fully complied with the court’s orders.